Download instructions for World Factbook. Adobe® Reader® is needed to view Adobe PDF files. If you don't already have Adobe Reader. CIA Chief FOIA Officer Report for FY Page 1. Andrew responsibilities attend any FOIA training or conference during the reporting period such as. Chief FOIA Officer Report , PDF. FY , FY16 Annual Report, PDF · XML. Chief FOIA Officer Report , PDF. FY , FY15 Annual Report.

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From Typist to Trailblazer: The Evolving View of Women in the CIA's Workforce. Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST). e4edbf. Intelligence Report on the Rendition, Detention, (SliDE/PdF) As noted in the Study, CIA sought to fill the vacuum in its RDI capabilities in. C.I.A. Torture Report. Document. Pages. Notes. Text. Zoom. CLOSE. Previous for “” Next. p. 1. Loading Loading. p. 2. Loading Loading. p. 3. Loading Loading.

The Committee makes the following findings and conclusions: The CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees. The Committee finds, based on a review of CIA interrogation records, that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of obtaining accurate information or gaining detainee cooperation. Other detainees provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been subjected to these techniques. While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and afterwards, multiple CIA detainees fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence. Detainees provided fabricated information on critical intelligence issues, including the terrorist threats which the CIA identified as its highest priorities. At numerous times throughout the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, CIA personnel assessed that the most effective method for acquiring intelligence from detainees, including from detainees the CIA considered to be the most "high-value," was to confront the detainees with information already acquired by the Intelligence Community. CIA officers regularly called into question whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective, assessing that the use of the techniques failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate intelligence. The CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness. The CIA represented to the White House, the National Security Council, the Department of Justice, the CIA Office of Inspector General, the Congress, and the public that the best measure of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was examples of specific terrorist plots "thwarted" and specific terrorists captured as a result of the use of the techniques. The CIA used these examples to claim that its enhanced interrogation techniques were not only effective, but also necessary to acquire "otherwise unavailable" actionable intelligence that "saved lives. The Committee reviewed 20 of the most frequent and prominent examples of purported counterterrorism successes that the CIA has attributed to the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques, and found them to be wrong in fundamental respects. In some cases, there was no relationship between the cited counterterrorism success and any information provided by detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In the. This page has been validated.

Beginning with the CIA's first detainee, Abu Zubaydah, and continuing with numerous others, the CIA applied its enhanced interrogation techniques with significant repetition for days or weeks at a time. Interrogation techniques such as slaps and "wallings" slamming detainees against a wall were used in combination, frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation and nudity.

Records do not support CIA representations that the CIA initially used an "an open, non-threatening approach," 2 or that interrogations began with the "least coercive technique possible" 3 and escalated to more coercive techniques only as necessary.

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The waterboarding technique was physically harmful, inducing convulsions and vomiting. Abu Zubaydah, for example, became "completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth. Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to hours, usually standing or in stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads.

The Committee makes the following findings and conclusions:. At least five detainees. CIA medical personnel.

Multiple psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause. Those representations were. House, the National Security Council principals, and their staffs. This prevented an accurate and.

Porter Goss, briefed the president on the specific CIA enhanced interrogation techniques before. April By that time, 38 of the 39 detainees identified as having been subjected to the CIA's. At the direction of the White House, the secretaries of state and defense - both principals on the.

This includes the provision of inaccurate statements similar to those provided to other elements. Government and later to the public, as well as instances in which specific questions. In briefings for the National. This reduced the ability of the U. In two other countries where negotiations on hosting new. By that time, 38 of the 39 detainees identified as having been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had already been subjected to the techniques.

File:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf

The CIA did not inform the president or vice president of the location of CIA detention facilities other than Country At the direction of the White House, the secretaries of state and defense - both principals on the National Security Council - were not briefed on program specifics until September An internal CIA email from July noted that " This includes the provision of inaccurate statements similar to those provided to other elements of the U.

Government and later to the public, as well as instances in which specific questions from White House officials were not answered truthfully or fully. In briefings for the National Security Council principals and White House officials, the CIA advocated for the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, warning that "[tjermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive. The CIA withheld or restricted information relevant to these agencies' missions and responsibilities, denied access to detainees, and provided inaccurate information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to these agencies.

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