This books (Nuremberg Diary [PDF]) Made by Gilbert About Books Paperback. Pub Date: 08 Pages: in Publisher: the the DaCapo. Gustave Gilbert, Hermann Goring. Nuremberg Diary is Gustave Gilbert's account of and interviews he conducted during the Nuremberg Trials of Nazi leaders, including Hermann Göring, involved in World War II and the Holocaust. Dr. Gilbert, a fluent German speaker, served as a prison. NUREMBERG DIARY BY G M GILBERT MYLADYLIKE - Nuremberg Diary By G M instructions sony w manual pdf minority populations and health an.
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Get this from a library! Nuremberg diary. [G M Gilbert]. Nuremberg Diary By G M Gilbert Myladylike - [PDF] [EPUB] Nuremberg Diary By G M Gilbert. Myladylike -. Nuremberg Diary By G M Gilbert Myladylike. First published: January nvrehs.info()CO;2-U. About. Related; Information. ePDF PDF.
In the diary I wrote at Nuremberg, and in a letter to my aunt in New York, I recorded some of the more horrifying and significant statements of the men we questioned, along with my personal reactions and observations. Sometimes I quoted the prisoners verbatim in the original German. From time to time, I return to my Nuremberg notebook. Whenever I do so, memories that have scarcely faded despite the passage of seven decades are vividly, often painfully, revived.
I HAD seen much horror prior to arriving at Nuremberg, during combat from the time I landed with the th Infantry Division at Normandy a week after the bloody initial June 6, invasion until fighting ended in Europe in May , and especially when my unit liberated the nightmarish Nordhausen concentration camp on April 12, Yet the contents of my Nuremberg diary still shock and even haunt me.
The stenographic transcripts of the interrogations have survived, to be sure, and confessions that we obtained can be heard being quoted when they were offered in evidence at the trial. But the typed transcripts cannot possibly convey the full, terrible reality of what it was like to participate in these proceedings.
I was one of some 30 language specialists employed by the US prosecution team. Most of us were recently discharged soldiers or officers who had served in military intelligence and who were now civilian employees of the War Department.
We were given captured German documents to translate into English and some of us were also assigned to interpret at interrogations and in court during the trial. During the trial sessions, we interpreted various languages into English, French and Russian, and we also interpreted the various languages into German, primarily for the defendants and their attorneys.
Many of the documents were of great historical importance and many were also highly incriminating. The individuals interrogated included both defendants and witnesses.
The questioning was usually conducted by a prosecutor, who was typically an attorney who was also a military officer. The interpreter had to be fully multilingual and also possess knowledge of the organization of the German state and military, the Nazi Party, the SS and the Gestapo.
Also present was a court reporter, who utilized a stenotype machine to prepare complete transcripts in English. Each transcript was checked for accuracy by the interrogator, the interpreter, and the defendant or witness, who was then directed to sign it. Security was provided by two white-helmeted military policemen bearing side arms. But nothing prepared me for what I was to encounter at Nuremberg. The contents of captured documents that I translated at Nuremberg and interrogations there at which I interpreted were deeply unsettling.
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Journal of Clinical Psychology Volume 4, Issue 1. But Hitler would not make concessions to Spain in Morocco, on account of France. Spain had no objections to the campaign; in fact, the Spaniards were ready for it.
Hechler: Who made this plan? Where and when was the conference on it? Unfortunately, I was not along.
Lack of shipping had prevented us from invading England, but, before the difficulties with Russia, we could have carried out the Gibraltar Plan, with 20 divisions in West Africa, 10 in North Africa and 20 against the Suez Canal, still leaving divisions in France. The entire Italian army, which was unfit for a major war, could have been used for occupation forces. The loss of Gibraltar might have induced England to sue for peace. Failure to carry out the plan was one of the major mistakes of the war.
The plan was originally mine. Hitler had similar ideas and everyone was enthusiastic about it. The navy was in favor of the plans, as it would have given the navy better bases. Instead of being cooped up in Biscay and Bordeaux, it could have had U-boat bases much farther out in Spain and the Atlantic islands.
If the campaign succeeded, I personally wanted to attack the Azores to secure U-boat bases there, which would have crippled British sea lanes.
The main task in taking Gibraltar would have fallen to the Luftwaffe. Paratroopers would have had to be dropped. So I was chiefly concerned, and I would have very eagerly carried out the operation. The Luftwaffe had many officers who had participated in the war in Spain a year and a half before and knew the people and the country. Even if Gibraltar had not been taken, we could have Algeciras [as a base of operations], and with mm siege mortars could have smashed the soft stone of Gibraltar and taken the base.
There was only one unprotected airfield on the Rock. In 24 hours the Royal Air Force would have been forced off the Rock, and we could have battered it to pieces.
This was a real task and we were eager to accomplish it. Ships would have been sunk by mines and no mine sweepers could have operated. Russia was bringing up large forces and making preparations on the frontier.
If an agreement had been reached with [Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav] Molotov in February , and the Russian danger had not been so real, we should certainly have carried out my plan in the spring of Hechler: Was the seizure of Dakar definitely part of your plan? The plan called for securing all of North Africa, so that there would be no possible chance of any enemy penetrating to the Mediterranean.
Such a possibility had to be excluded under all circumstances. Dakar was about the southwestern extremity. We would not have gone as far south as Freetown, for example. It would have taken much too long for anyone to attack across the desert with neither roads nor water supply adequate for the purpose. There was, therefore, no real danger to the Mediterranean from that far south.
We would have taken Cyprus, too. I would have taken it right after we took Crete. We could also have taken Malta easily. Then the Atlantic islands would have been further protection for the coast of Africa. But fear of Russia stopped us. We had only eight divisions on the whole Russian frontier at the time. Nor could the Luftwaffe support the Russian campaign after Crete to the extent that Hitler had anticipated. Indeed, after the debacle at Crete, Hitler turned his back on large-scale airborne operations forever.
Molotov made the following demands in February a second war on Finland, to result in Russian occupation of the entire country; invasion of Romania and occupation of part of the country; strengthened Russian position in Bulgaria; solution of the Dardanelles question none of us wished to see Russia there ; and the question of the Skagerrak and the Kattegat.
This made us fall out of our chairs, it was so incredible. This was the last straw; Molotov was not to be heard any further. Germany would not even discuss it. We would have no objections to Russia having a sphere of influence in Finland, but Hitler felt that if Russia occupied the whole of Finland, she would reach out to Swedish iron ore mines and the port of Narvik, and we did not want the Russians as our northern neighbors, with troops in Scandinavia.
The German people were also very sympathetic toward the valiant Finns. The Russian move northwest would have tended to outflank Germany. Similarly, the Russians in Romania might not necessarily go south, but might move westward to encircle Germany on that side.
By denying us the nickel of Finland and the grain and oil of Romania, Russia could have exerted economic pressure against us, and in or so proceeded to direct military action. These were the main reasons that kept us from arriving at any agreement.
In November , when the first alarming reports came from the east, Hitler gave his first orders to OKW regarding the steps which would have to be taken if the situation with Russia became dangerous. Provision had to be made for the eventuality of a Russian attack. In March , Hitler made up his mind to launch a preventive attack on Russia as a practical matter. I had favored making more concessions to Molotov, since I believed that if Russia invaded Finland and Romania, the differences between her and Britain and the United States would have become insuperable.
Hitler, however, was personally distrustful of Russia all the time and saw in her, with the mighty armaments she had been piling up for 10 years, the great future enemy of Germany. In the long run, Russia might then fight England and not against us.